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I am grateful to Daniel Weinstock and Avigail Eisenberg for their
comments on my ideas concerning liberal multiculturalism and my concept
of ‘multicultural measures’. Following their remarks, I would now like to
clarify a number of points.
Both Weinstock and Eisenberg have observed that I have given insuffici-
ent reason to show that the proposed multicultural measures are only
temporary. My text can indeed give rise to misunderstanding in this matter.
It is not my intent to deny a place in liberal multiculturalism for permanent
measures to accommodate diversity and pluralism.
My case for active pluralism as a form of moderate, pragmatic secular-
ism instead of radical secularism implies various permanent measures in
order to guarantee pluralism in the public sphere (versus a politics of
laissez-faire or hands-off neutrality). For example, if a liberal policy wishes
to guarantee that citizens ‘shall not be denied the right to profess and
practice their own religion’, this will imply some permanent measures.
Provision of (permanent) subsidies to the various recognized religions is a
possible option. Also, the idea, mentioned by Eisenberg, that all public
institutions, rules and practices must be scrutinized to determine whether
they are unfairly biased can be seen as a permanent component of a policy
that actively strives to implement a just multicultural society.
The difference between these permanent measures and the temporary
multicultural measures as defined in my article on liberal multiculturalism,
is that the former do not constitute group differentiated measures. They
are measures that support multiculturalism, but apply equally to the
various groups. For instance, if a government decides to actively support
pluralism by subsidizing the various recognized religions, or by offering
courses in the various religions as part of the public education system, then
the subsidies and educational support must apply with the same criteria to
all of the recognized religions. Indeed, if this is not the case, and the
various groups are treated differently, this will often be viewed as an
injustice. The subsidy system in Belgium contains an injustice in this area
since it differentiates between the financial support given to the Catholic
church and other religions: while the subsidy given to the Catholic church
is based on the number of inhabitants per parish, regardless of their faith,
other religions are subsidized on the basis of the number of their member-




Almost no one disputes ‘that equality is key amongst the principles that
ought to guide public deliberation and decision making in diverse societies’,
as Eisenberg also observes. In as far as everybody indeed agrees that ‘egal-
itarianism provides the only defensible context in which cultural diversity
is appropriately protected’, good and valid reasons must be given if a group-
differentiated policy is to be implemented. As I have argued, this can only
occur on condition that the special treatment of certain groups serves to
neutralize an unfair inequality of opportunities that all citizens legitimately
strive for. Egalitarian liberalism does not rule out group-based policies, but
these policies are only legitimate on certain conditions. The group-differ-
entiated multicultural measures as proposed in my paper are thus
conditional; they are only legitimate as long as they are necessary to rectify
an unfair disadvantage or inequality. This is what I mean by the idea that
the group-differentiated multicultural measures are ‘in principle’
temporary – as long as the unfair inequality persists. Again, this does not
rule out the possibility that these measures will in practice have a perma-
nent character, because, for example, there may be no other way to elimi-
nate the inequality. I do not think that the question about permanent or
temporary measures is ‘entirely contingent’, as Weinstock argues, or is ‘not
an issue at the heart of the debate about multiculturalism’, as Eisenberg
asserts: various egalitarian opponents of minority rights specifically criticize
the idea of minority rights because they imply permanent group-
differentiated measures to perpetuate cultural differences indefinitely. With
my argument, I aim to disarm this criticism, and thereby maintain the
validity of several of the multicultural proposals formulated by Kymlicka
and others.
In summary, we can differentiate between multicultural measures that
are intended to fairly promote pluralism by treating various groups in the
same fashion, and measures which are intended to fairly promote pluralism
by treating groups in a differentiated fashion. In my article, I have regarded
only this last category as multicultural measures: it concerns group-
differentiated measures for ethnic, cultural and religious minorities. The
argument that multicultural measures are temporary, then, concerns only
these group differentiated measures, not measures that apply equally to all
groups.
Another problem, raised by Weinstock, is about my use of the ‘rule-
and-exemption’ approach. He argues that if it is allowed for schoolchildren
to absent themselves from classes for religious reasons, there must be many
other good reasons for parents to take their children out of school at odd
times. He says, ‘What the case of the Flemish directive reveals is that the
state ought to give parents this latitude for a whole host of valid reasons,
and not solely for specifically cultural or religious ones.’ I think this is right,
but in fact, it is the other way around: because parents sometimes have
good reason to keep their children from school, there is a long-standing
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regulation that permits this. On parental authority, children may legally be
absent for a limited number of (half) days. The novelty of the new direc-
tive is that religious holy days are now explicitly recognized under certain
circumstances as a valid reason for absence.
Should we then not have a regulation that explicitly recognizes a visit to
good old Aunt Millie at the retirement home, or a family vacation to the
countryside, as valid reasons for absence? I think not. First, the differenti-
ation between choice and circumstance as previously mentioned is relevant
here. Furthermore, there are sufficient regular school vacations for such
activities. In the case of religious holy days, this is different: membership of
a religion is not a free choice, and it is not possible to reschedule holy days
to fit school vacations.
Above all, and this is the essence of my argument, it concerns a particu-
lar measure intended to create more equality, specifically in the area of
religious observance. The proposed multicultural measure has the intention
to rectify an unfair inequality. This equality argument has no relevance to
parents who take their children from school to visit Aunt Millie.
And as we have seen, use of the ‘sufficiency principle’ also puts a brake
on the slippery slope which Weinstock warns us of. In this area, there is a
difference between the traditional liberals such as Barry, for whom access
to the culture of choice forms no part in their discussions about justice, and
the liberal culturalists such as Carens Raz and Kymlicka for whom access
to your own culture is an essential element of justice. Contrary to the
suggestion of Eisenberg, Barry does not actually elaborate on the question
of an acceptable minimum for cultural experience which should be guaran-
teed by government, since he regards cultural identity as a personal (and
sometimes expensive) preference which is entirely the responsibility of the
individual concerned. The sufficiency principle is only relevant for those
writers who wish to consider access to the culture of choice as a primary
social good. I admit that the sufficiency principle does not give unambigu-
ous guidance, yet ‘what counts as the minimally acceptable level of cultural
experience’ can only allow a limited breadth of interpretation. The various
religious communities and their members will usually make clear what is
for them the essential minimum, and it is the task of a multicultural policy
to determine to what extent this minimum can be provided without violat-
ing liberal principles.
In conclusion, a few words about Eisenbergs’s remark that liberalism is
culturally specific and under-inclusive. In that context, I would point to the
difference between liberalism as a historically rooted practice, and liberal-
ism as a normative political theory. It is quite possible that historical liberal-
ism does not live up to theoretical ideals, and might never do so due to the
need for practical application within a complex historical and social reality.
Philosophical liberalism, however, is based on autonomy as a core value.
The concept of tolerance is an essential corollary of this. If it should appear
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that there are elements present in historical liberalism which conflict with
the ideals of philosophical liberalism, then historical liberalism should
adapt itself to the extent possible. Such discrepancies between historical
and philosophical liberalism can occur because liberalism is in practice
insufficiently refined and matured, or that new circumstances challenge
historical liberalism, or that theories are incorrectly applied, or a combi-
nation of the above factors.
Regarding the origins of liberalism, Eisenberg is right: every liberal
political system has historical roots and often de facto favours the cultural
majority. It is precisely the role of liberal multiculturalism to readjust the
day-to-day practice of liberalism where that might result in ‘marginalization
and disadvantage for people who do not share in the historical traditions
and debates that gave rise to and sustain these values’. Eisenberg writes that
it is a permanent project of multiculturalism within liberal societies ‘to
determine, on the basis of a fuller inclusion of ethnically diverse peoples,
which liberal values and institutions are inflexible, which are unfairly
biased, which can and should be altered and which cannot be altered’.
According to Eisenberg, we have to distance ourselves from liberalism in
order to expand the possibilities of our own theories about equality and
individual well-being. Here, I do not agree. To expand the possibilities of
our own theories about equality and individual well-being, we do not have
to distance ourselves from liberalism. On the contrary, liberalism can
develop and adapt itself from within. Contrary to Eisenberg, I am
convinced that criticism of liberal values and institutions as historically
evolved and functioning in social practice can be delivered from within
liberal political philosophy itself. Liberalism as a set of theoretical ideals
about autonomy, pluralism and equality has a great deal of potential to
readjust the liberal social reality. That is also what I mean by the sentence:
in practice, liberalism does not make full use of its multicultural potential.
It is the task of multicultural liberalism to reveal and apply that multi-
cultural potential within liberalism.
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